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Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person
noncooperative games




Two-person noncooperative games with ¯nitely many pure strategies and
ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probabil-
ity distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according
to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-best reply is a strategy that induces
a t-degree stochastically undominated distribution, and a t-equilibrium is
a pair of t-best replies. The paper provides a characterization and exis-
tence proofs of t-equilibria in terms of representing utility functions, and
shows that for t becoming large|which can be interpreted as the play-
ers becoming more risk averse|behavior converges to a speci¯c form of
max-min play. More precisely, this means that in the limit each player
puts all weight on a strategy that maximizes the worst outcome for the
opponent, within the supports of the strategies in the limiting sequence
of t-equilibria.
1 Introduction
In order for a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a two-person noncooperative
game to make sense, a minimal condition is that the players have exact knowl-
edge about cardinal, von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations of their
preferences over the outcomes of the game. This, however, is a strong assump-
tion: it presumes that such representations exist and are known to the players,
and it results, generically, in sharp point-beliefs about the mixed strategy of the
opponent.
In this paper we start by assuming that the players have complete knowl-
edge only about the ordinal preferences over the pure outcomes in the game.
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1A natural way, then, to evaluate probability distributions over the outcomes
induced by mixed strategies is to order them by ¯rst-degree stochastic domi-
nance: probability distributions that shift more probability to better outcomes
are considered more attractive. Since the stochastic dominance ordering is not
complete, we call a mixed strategy of a player a best reply against the strategy
of the opponent if it induces an undominated probability distribution over the
outcomes. An equilibrium is a pair of best replies. Fishburn (1978) established
that the set of equilibria is equal to the union of all sets of Nash equilibria, taken
over all possible utility representations of the preferences. This is an intuitive
result in view of the familiar characterization of ¯rst-degree stochastic domi-
nance which says that a distribution is undominated if and only if it maximizes
expected utility for at least one utility representation of the ordinal preferences.
We take this analysis a good deal further by assuming that the players have
more speci¯c knowledge about their risk attitudes or, equivalently, about the
derived classes of utility functions that may represent their preferences. Specif-
ically, we study so-called t-equilibria, where the natural number t is the degree
of stochastic dominance used to evaluate probability distributions. As is well-
known, a distribution is second-degree stochastically undominated if and only
if it maximizes expected utility for at least one concave utility representation
of the ordinal preferences. Loosely speaking, higher degrees of stochastic domi-
nance correspond to higher degrees of risk aversion.
After preliminaries about stochastic dominance, games and equilibria in Sec-
tions 2 and 3, we consider an example in Section 4 which nicely illustrates these
concepts and the main results of the paper. These results are, ¯rst, a char-
acterization of t-degree stochastic dominance in terms of representing utility
functions and existence of t-equilibria in Section 5, and, second, limit behavior
as the degree of stochastic dominance t goes to in¯nity, in Section 6.
Existence of t-equilibria can be established directly by using a ¯xed point
argument (this is done in Appendix B) or indirectly by using representation by
utility functions and existence of Nash equilibrium (Section 5).
It follows from the results of Section 5 that the sets of characterizing utility
functions become smaller as t grows, as already indicated by the transition
from t = 1 to t = 2. Consequently, the best reply correspondences and sets of t-
equilibria decrease as well. In Section 6 we provide a complete characterization
of the sets of pure strategies that can serve as supports for t-equilibria as t
becomes large. In the limit, such equilibria converge to max-min play, in the
sense that each player plays a pure strategy that, among the strategies in the
supports, maximizes the worst outcome for the opponent. Observe that this is
very di®erent from what is usually meant by max-min play, namely that players
maximize their own worst outcomes. Max-min play in the present setting is
closer to equilibrium play: for large t, a player puts probability close to 1 on
the pure strategy maximizing the worst outcome for the opponent among the
strategies in the support of the opponent's mixed strategy, in order to keep all
these strategies undominated. The intuition for this is that, as t becomes large,
2the opponent attaches increasing weights to worse outcomes, and to compensate
for this a player should put low weights on those own strategies that possibly
result in these worse outcomes for the opponent.
Section 7 concludes the paper with a brief discussion of related literature
and directions for further research. Appendix A collects the proofs of Section 2,
and Appendix B gives an independent existence result of t-equilibria by a ¯xed
point argument.
2 Stochastic dominance
Let ` ¸ 1 be an integer and let O = f1;:::;`g be a set of ` alternatives. For
1 · k < l · ` we assume that a decision maker strictly prefers alternative l to
alternative k.
For a probability distribution r = (r1;:::;r`) on O (so each l occurs with
probability rl) we de¯ne, recursively, for each l 2 f1;:::;`g, F0






r (i) (t ¸ 1):
So F1
r is the cumulative distribution function of F0
r = r and, similarly, Ft
r
`accumulates' the weights assigned by Ft¡1
r . For probability distributions r and
s on O, r t-th degree stochastically dominates s if
Ft
r(l) · Ft
s(l) for every l 2 f1;:::;`g
with at least one inequality strict. Observe that the latter follows if r 6= s. For
t = 1, this relation means that r puts more probability on better alternatives
than s. It is well known that this is equivalent to the expected utility under
r being at least as large as the expected utility under s for every utility repre-
sentation of the preference relation. For second degree stochastic dominance,
an analogous equivalence holds if we restrict to concave utility functions, or,
more generally, utility functions with non-increasing di®erences between adja-
cent alternatives. Therefore, ¯rst degree stochastic dominance is a purely ordi-
nal concept but this is not the case for second and higher degrees. Note that
t-th degree stochastic dominance implies t + 1-th degree stochastic dominance.
In a relative sense, a similar relation holds between t + 1-th and t-th degree
stochastic dominance as between second and ¯rst degree stochastic dominance.
Thus, higher degree stochastic dominance can be associated with increased risk
aversion of decision makers.
Fishburn (1976, 1980) characterizes stochastic dominance in terms of util-
ity functions and in terms of moments of distributions. Below, we provide a
characterization of stochastically undominated distributions in terms of utility




r(`) and let A = [aij] be the ` £ `-matrix with
aij =
½
1 if i · j
0 if i > j for all i;j 2 f1;:::;`g.




r = rAt for every t 2 I N.
Denoting the element in row i and column j of At by at
ij, we derive the following
expression for this number.





(j¡i)!(t¡1)! if i · j
0 if i > j
:
The following lemma applies to t approaching in¯nity.
Lemma 2.3 Let i;i0;j 2 f1;:::;`g with i < i0 · j. Then at
ij ¸ at
i0j for every





For every t 2 I N let1
Ut := fu 2 I R` j u = ¡Atc for some c 2 I R`, c > 0g:
An element u of Ut can be interpreted as a utility function representing the
implicit preference ordering by the assignment i 7! ui, since u1 < u2 < ¢¢¢ < u`.
Call a probability distribution r over O t-undominated if there is no probability
distribution s such that s t-th degree stochastically dominates r. Then we have
the following result, which adapts Fishburn (1976) to our context.
Proposition 2.4 The probability distribution r over O is t-undominated if and




l=1 slul for all probability
distributions s over O.
Note that U1 contains essentially any utility representation of ¾. This is con-
sistent with remarks made earlier. The set Ut is decreasing in t.
Proofs of Lemmas 2.1{2.3 and Proposition 2.4 can be found in Appendix A.
1For vectors x and y, x > y [x ¸ y] means xi > yi [xi ¸ yi] for every coordinate i. Similarly
for x < y, x · y.
43 Two-person games and t-equilibria
Consider two players. Player 1 has pure strategy set M = f1;:::;mg. A
(mixed) strategy for player 1 is a probability distribution over M. Denote
the set of strategies for player 1 by ¢M. A pure strategy i is identi¯ed with
the mixed strategy ei 2 ¢M, where ei
k = 1 if k = i and ei
k = 0 otherwise.
Similarly, player 2 has pure strategy set N = f1;:::;ng and (mixed) strategy
set ¢N. A pure strategy j is identi¯ed with the mixed strategy ej 2 ¢N. If
player 1 plays pure strategy i and player 2 pure strategy j, then the alternative
oij results. If player 1 plays p 2 ¢M and player 2 plays q 2 ¢N, then oij
results with probability piqj. Let O := foij j i 2 M; j 2 Ng and assume that
players 1 and 2 have preference relations represented, respectively, by bijections
¾;¿ : M £ N ! f1;:::;mng. For instance, if 1 · k < l · mn then player 1
strictly prefers oij to oi0j0, where ¾(i;j) = l and ¾(i0;j0) = k.
For p 2 ¢M and q 2 ¢N we denote by pq¾ the vector of probabilities with
l-th coordinate pq¾l = piqj such that ¾(i;j) = l, for all l 2 f1;:::;mng. We
assume that the players evaluate strategies according to a stochastic dominance
criterion. More precisely, let t 2 I N and ¯x a strategy q 2 ¢N for player 2.
Then a strategy p 2 ¢M of player 1 results in the weight vector Ft
pq¾, which
depends on ¾ and assigns weight Ft
pq¾(¾(i;j)) to alternative oij.
We call p a t-best reply against q if there is no p0 2 ¢M such that p0q t-th
degree stochastically dominates pq. The de¯nition of a t-best reply q against p
is analogous. A pair (p;q) 2 ¢M £ ¢N is a t-equilibrium if p is a t-best reply
against q and vice versa. By Et we denote the set of t-equilibria.
4 An example
The example presented here is illustrative of the main results of this paper,
namely (i) existence and characterization of t-equilibria; and (ii) asymptotic
behavior for t approaching in¯nity.





where the rows are the pure strategies of player 1, the columns those of player
2, and the preferences are given by ¾(1;2) = 1, ¾(2;2) = 2, ¾(2;1) = 3, and
¾(1;1) = 4 for player 1 and ¿(1;2) = 1, ¿(1;1) = 2, ¿(2;1) = 3, and ¿(2;2) = 4
for player 2.
We concentrate on player 1. The matrix At (t ¸ 1) can be computed using







2t(t + 1) 1
6t(t + 1)(t + 2)
0 1 t 1
2t(t + 1)
0 0 1 t





Consider strategies p = (p1;p2) and q = (q1;q2) for players 1 and 2, respectively.
In order to examine t-best replies of player 1 we compute (cf. Lemma 2.1)
Ft
pq¾ = (p1q2;p2q2;p2q1;p1q1)At:
Dropping the part that does not depend on p and which therefore is not needed






(t2 ¡ t)q2 ¡ q1;
1
6
(t3 ¡ t)q2 ¡ q1(t ¡ 1)
¶
: (1)
For t = 1, (1) reduces to p1(q2;0;¡q1;0). Since player 1 wants to `minimize'
this vector, the t-best responses are p1 = 0 if q1 = 0, p1 = 1 if q1 = 1, and any
0 · p1 · 1 if 0 < q1 < 1. With a similar argument for player 2 (not reproduced
here) we ¯nd the set E1: it contains the two pure Nash equilibria of the game,
resulting in o11 and in o22, and all strategy combinations where no player plays
a pure strategy. This is no surprise: in general, E1 consists of all strategy com-
binations that are a Nash equilibrium for at least one choice of utility functions
representing ¾ and ¿. This is a consequence of the familiar characterization
of ¯rst degree stochastic dominance using utility representations, mentioned in
Section 2. See also Fishburn (1978), where the result is derived formally.
Next, consider t = 2, so best replies are second degree stochastically undomi-
nated. By substituting t = 2 in (1) it follows that for q1 = 1 the 2-best reply
is p1 = 1, for 1 > q1 > 1
2 any 0 · p1 · 1 is a 2-best reply, and for q1 · 1
2 the
2-best reply is p1 = 0. Again after a similar argument for player 2 it follows








In these mixed strategy equilibria player 1 puts a larger weight on row 2. Row
2 is player 1's max-min pure strategy: he prefers the worst alternative in row
2, o22, to the worst alternative in row 1, o12. Thus, one might be tempted to
conclude that a higher t leads to max-min play. This, however, is deceptive. As
will turn out later, what is important is that row 2 is the max-min row from
the point of view of player 2: player 2 prefers the worst alternative (for him) of
row 2, o21, to the worst alternative of row 1, o12. (A similar consideration holds
for the strategy of player 2.)
6Observe also that the 2-best reply correspondences of the players are not
upper semi-continuous (their graphs are not closed).
For t > 2, let ^ q1 = (t3 ¡ t)=(t3 + 5t ¡ 6). For 0 · q1 · ^ q1 the t-best reply is
p1 = 0, for ^ q1 < q1 < 1 any p1 is a t-best reply, and for q1 = 1 the t-best reply
is p1 = 1. The t-equilibria are again the two pure Nash equilibria in the game
together with the collection
f(p;q) j
t3 ¡ t
t3 + 5t ¡ 6
< q1 < 1; 0 < p1 < 1 ¡
t3 ¡ t
t3 + 5t ¡ 6
g;
For t ! 1 these mixed strategy t-equilibria converge to the pure strategy
combination of row 2 and column 1.
5 Existence and characterization of t-equilibria
The existence of t-equilibria can be proved directly by applying a ¯xed point ar-
gument to the best-reply correspondences. This proof is not completely straight-
forward since the best reply correspondences do not have to be upper semi-
continuous, see the example in the previous section, so that the argument has
to be applied to a suitable sub-correspondence. For the details, see Appendix
B.
Alternatively, t-equilibria can be characterized as Nash equilibria for suitably
chosen utility functions, by an argument analogous to the proof of Proposition
2.4. Existence then follows from the standard existence result for Nash equilib-
rium. This is the approach taken here. For t = 1, this has already been done in
Fishburn (1978).
In the next lemma we consider the game as de¯ned in Section 3. The bijec-
tion ¾ represents the preference relation of player 1. The set Ut was de¯ned in
Section 2.
Lemma 5.1 Let p 2 ¢M, q 2 ¢N, and t ¸ 1. Then p is a t-best reply against














for all p0 2 ¢M.
Proof. p is a t-best reply against q if and only if there is no p0 2 ¢M such that
Ft
p0q¾ · Ft
pq¾ with at least one coordinate strictly smaller. This is the case if
and only if
fx 2 I Rmn j x · Ft
pq¾g \ fx 2 I Rmn j x = Ft
p0q¾ for some p0 2 ¢Mg = fFt
pq¾g:
7By a separation argument analogous to the one in the proof of Proposition
2.4 this, in turn, holds if and only if there is a c 2 I Rmn with c > 0 such
that Ft
pq¾ ¢ c · Ft
p0q¾ ¢ c for all p0 2 ¢M. By Lemma 2.1 this is equivalent
to (pq¾)Atc · (p0q¾)Atc for all p0 2 ¢M. The proof is complete by taking
ut := ¡Atc. 2
Lemma 5.1 can be formulated for player 2 in an analogous way. Then t-equilibria
can be characterized as follows.
Corollary 5.2 Let ¾ and ¿ represent the preferences of players 1 and 2, re-
spectively. Let t ¸ 1, p¤ 2 ¢M, and q¤ 2 ¢N. Then (p¤;q¤) is a t-equilibrium
if and only if there are u;v 2 Ut such that (p¤;q¤) is a Nash equilibrium for the
payo® functions O ! I R de¯ned by oij 7! u¾(i;j) and oij 7! v¿(i;j) for players 1
and 2, respectively.
Since Nash equilibria always exist, Corollary 5.2 implies existence of t-equilibria.
Corollary 5.3 Et 6= ; for every t ¸ 1.
6 Limiting behavior of equilibria
The example in Section 4 suggests some kind of max-min behavior of the players
in a t-equilibrium for t going to in¯nity. In this section we consider this in detail.
The setting is the general game model as de¯ned in Section 3. Unless stated
otherwise, the number t is arbitrary but ¯xed. The preferences of the players
are represented by the bijections ¾ for player 1 and ¿ for player 2.
For p 2 ¢M, the support of p is the set
supp(p) = fi 2 M j pi > 0g:
For q 2 ¢N, supp(q) is de¯ned in the same way. We start with an auxiliary
result.
Lemma 6.1 Let pt 2 ¢M and let qt 2 ¢N. Let p 2 ¢M and q 2 ¢N with
supp(p) µ supp(pt) and supp(q) µ supp(qt). Then
(i) if pt is a t-best reply against qt, then p is a t-best reply against qt;
(ii) if qt is a t-best reply against pt, then q is a t-best reply against pt.
Proof. Apply Lemma 5.1. 2
Lemma 6.2 Let I µ M, J µ N, and let (pt;qt)t2I N be a sequence of pairs of
mixed strategies such that I = supp(pt) and J = supp(qt) for all t 2 I N.
8(i) Let pt be a t-best reply against qt for every t 2 I N. Then, for every i 2 M,
there is a j 2 J such that ¾(i;j) < ¾(i0;j) for all i0 2 Infig.
(ii) Let qt be a t-best reply against pt for every t 2 I N. Then, for every j 2 N,
there is an i 2 I such that ¿(i;j) < ¿(i;j0) for all j0 2 Jnfjg.
Proof. We only prove (i), the proof of (ii) is analogous. Suppose (i) were not
true. Then there is an ^ { 2 M such that for every j 2 J
Ij := fi 2 I j ¾(i;j) < ¾(^ {;j)g 6= ;:
For every j 2 J, choose an ij 2 Ij. Let ^ I := fij j j 2 Jg, s := j^ Ij, 2 and de¯ne
^ p 2 ¢M by ^ pi = 1=s if i 2 ^ I and ^ pi = 0 otherwise. We will show that, for t
su±ciently large,
Ft
e^ {qt¾ · Ft
^ pqt¾: (2)
Since, clearly, the two probability distributions e^ {qt¾ and ^ pqt¾ in (2) are di®er-
ent, this means that at least one of the inequalities must be strict if (2) holds.
Since supp(^ p) µ I = supp(pt) for all t, (2) contradicts Lemma 6.1. This proves
(i).
We are left to prove (2), hence we are left to prove
Ft
e^ {qt¾(k) · Ft
^ pqt¾(k) for all k = 1;:::;mn. (3)


















Here, the ¯rst equality follows from Lemma 2.1, the second equality from Lemma































The ¯rst equality follows again by Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2. The ¯rst inequality
follows since some terms are left out. The second equality follows by de¯nition
of ^ p since ij 2 ^ I for every j 2 J. The last inequality follows by the ¯rst
statement in Lemma 2.3 since ¾(ij;j) · ¾(^ {;j) ¡ 1 for every j 2 J.
If Jk = ; then (3) follows immediately from (4) and (5). Otherwise, by the
second statement in Lemma 2.3 there is a t su±ciently large such that for every





¾(^ {;j)¡1;k ¸ qt
jat
¾(^ {;j);k: (6)
Then (3) follows from (4), (5), and (6). 2
Lemma 6.2(i) implies that for every row (pure strategy) i in I there must be a
column (pure strategy) j in J such that the resulting outcome oij is the worst
outcome for player 1 in that column restricted to the rows in I. In turn, this
implies jIj · jJj. Similarly, Lemma 6.2(ii) implies jJj · jIj. So we have the
following result.
Corollary 6.3 Let I µ M, J µ N, and let (pt;qt)t2I N be a sequence of t-
equilibria such that I = supp(pt) and J = supp(qt) for all t 2 I N. Then
jIj = jJj.
If jIj = jJj = 1 in Corollary 6.3, then the sequence of t-equilibria reduces to
the constant Nash equilibrium in which player 1 picks the best element from
the column played by player 2 and player 2 picks the best element from the row
played by player 1.
The next result implies that in Corollary 6.3 the t-equilibria must converge
to pure strategy combinations.
Lemma 6.4 Let I µ M, J µ N, and let (pt;qt)t2I N be a sequence of t-equilibria
such that I = supp(pt) and J = supp(qt) for all t 2 I N. Let ^ { 2 I and ^ | 2
J such that minf¿(i;j) j j 2 Jg < minf¿(^ {;j) j j 2 Jg for all i 2 Inf^ {g
and minf¾(i;j) j i 2 Ig < minf¾(i;^ |) j i 2 Ig for all j 2 Jnf^ |g. Then (i)
limt!1 pt
^ { = 1 and (ii) limt!1 qt
^ | = 1.
Proof. We only prove (ii), the proof of (i) is analogous. By Lemma 6.2 and
Corollary 6.3 we may renumber the strategies of the players such that:
(a) I = J = f1;:::;sg for some s ¸ 1;
10(b) ¾(j;j) < ¾(i;j) for every j 2 J and i 2 Infjg;
(c) ¾(1;1) < ¾(2;2) < ::: < ¾(s;s).
Note that ^ | = s. Let s0 2 f1;:::;s ¡ 1g arbitrary. To prove (ii), it is su±cient
to prove that limt!1 qt
s0 = 0. Suppose that this is not the case. Then we may
assume that there is an ® > 0 such that qt
s0 ¸ ® for all t (otherwise there is
a subsequence with this property and we can apply the following argument to
this subsequence). De¯ne the strategy ^ p 2 ¢M by ^ pi = 1=s0 for i = 1;:::;s0
and ^ pi = 0 otherwise. We will show that ^ pqt¾ is t-dominated by es
0+1qt¾ for
su±ciently large t, which contradicts Lemma 6.1 and therefore completes the
proof. So we are left to show that for t su±ciently large
Ft
es0+1qt¾(k) · Ft
^ pqt¾(k) for every k = 1;:::;mn: (7)
(Since the probability distributions es
0+1qt¾ and ^ pqt¾ are clearly di®erent, at
least one of the inequalities in (7) must be strict.)
Let k 2 f1;:::;mng. By (b) and Lemma 2.3 we can choose t1 such that for
all t ¸ t1 we have
at
¾(j;j);k ¸ sat
¾(s0+1;j);k for all j = 1;:::;s0 ¡ 1: (8)



















































where the ¯rst inequality follows from (8){(10). This implies (7) and completes
the proof of the lemma. 2
Lemma 6.4 has the following converse.
11Lemma 6.5 Let I µ M and J µ N satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in Lemma
6.2, and let t 2 I N. Then there are pt 2 ¢M and qt 2 ¢N with supp(pt) = I,
supp(qt) = J, and (pt;qt) 2 Et.
Proof. Note that, as before, (i) and (ii) in Lemma 6.2 imply jIj = jJj. If
jIj = jJj = 1, then there is a pure Nash equilibrium (pt;qt) 2 Et with supports
I and J. Assume now that jIj = jJj ¸ 2. As in the proof of Lemma 6.4 we may
renumber the pure strategies of the players such that
(a) I = J = f1;:::;sg for some s ¸ 2;
(b) ¾(j;j) < ¾(i;j) for every j 2 J and i 2 Infjg;
(c) ¾(1;1) < ¾(2;2) < ::: < ¾(s;s).




1;mn for every j = 2;:::;s: (11)
We will show that every p 2 ¢M with supp(p) µ I is a t-best reply against
qt. Since we can de¯ne pt analogously and show that every q 2 ¢N with
supp(q) µ J is a t-best reply against pt, the proof is complete.
So let p 2 ¢M with supp(p) µ I. Assume, contrary to what we wish to
prove, that there is a p0 2 ¢M such that pqt is t-dominated by p0qt. We ¯rst
argue that without loss of generality supp(p) \ supp(p0) = ;. For, suppose
that i is an element in this intersection, and let ® := minfpi;p0
ig. De¯ne ¹ p :=
1=(1 ¡ ®)(p ¡ ®ei) and ¹ p0 := 1=(1 ¡ ®)(p0 ¡ ®ei). Then ¹ p; ¹ p0 2 ¢M, and ¹ pqt is
still t-dominated by ¹ p0qt, whereas i = 2 supp(¹ p) \ supp(¹ p0) and supp(¹ p) µ I.
So assume that supp(p) \ supp(p0) = ;, and take ^ { 2 supp(p0) such that
p0
^ { ¸ 1=m. If ^ { 2 I then let ^ | := ^ {. Then, by condition (b), ¾(^ {;^ |) < ¾(i;^ |) for all
i 2 Inf^ {g, hence for all i 2 supp(p) in particular. If ^ { 2 MnI then by condition
(i) in Lemma 6.2 we can take ^ | 2 J such that ¾(^ {;^ |) < ¾(i;^ |) for all i 2 I, hence
for all i 2 supp(p). Together with conditions (b) and (c) this implies
¾(^ {;^ |) < ¾(i;j) for all i 2 supp(p) and j 2 f^ |;:::;sg: (12)




































where the ¯rst equality follows from Lemma 2.1; the second equality by (12);
the ¯rst inequality by Lemma 2.2; the second (strict) inequality and the third
equality by (11); the third inequality since at
¾(^ {;^ |);k ¸ 1; and the ¯nal inequality
by Lemma 2.1 and the choice of p0
^ { ¸ 1=m.
Since (13) contradicts the assumption that pqt is t-dominated by p0qt, the
proof of the lemma is complete. 2
Lemmas 6.2, 6.4, and 6.5, and Corollary 6.3 can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 6.6 If I µ M, J µ N, and if (pt;qt)t2I N is a sequence of t-equilibria
such that I = supp(pt) and J = supp(qt) for all t 2 I N, then (i) and (ii) in
Lemma 6.2 hold, jIj = jJj, and the sequence of t-equilibria converges to the pure
strategy combination (^ {;^ |), where ^ { and ^ | are as in Lemma 6.4. Conversely, if
; 6= I µ M and ; 6= J µ N satisfy (i) and (ii) in Lemma 6.2, then a sequence
of t-equilibria with supports I and J for players 1 and 2, respectively, exists.
As announced earlier, the results in this section imply that, as t becomes large,
the equilibrium behavior of the players converges to max-min play in a speci¯c
sense. Take any sequence of t-equilibria with (without loss of generality) con-
stant supports I and J of the players' strategies. Then, in the limit, player 1
puts all weight on that strategy (row) in I in which the worst outcome for player
2 with respect to the strategies (columns) in J is maximal among all rows in I;
and player 2 puts all weight on that column in J in which the worst outcome
for player 1 with respect to the rows in I is maximal among all columns in J.
The next examples illustrate this further.
Example 6.7 Consider the following 3£3 game, in which the numbers express








In this game, I := M = f1;2;3g and J := N = f1;2;3g clearly satisfy (i) and
(ii) in Lemma 6.2. Obviously, ^ { = ^ | = 3. For every t 2 I N the t-equilibrium
used in the proof of Lemma 6.5 is de¯ned by
pt = qt =
µ
1
1 + A + A2;
A
1 + A + A2;
A2
1 + A + A2
¶
13where A = 9(7 + t)!=8!(t ¡ 1)!. In this equilibrium the weights on the ¯rst two




2) converges to zero as
well. That is, the weight on the ¯rst row (column) goes to 0 much faster than the
weight on the second row (column). The latter phenomenon is not a necessary
one: in the present example, for instance, it is also possible to have a sequence
of t-equilibria with equal weights on the ¯rst two rows (columns). It can be




2 =: ®t such that (1¡2®t)=®t > at
1;3+at
1;8
for every t 2 I N is again a t-equilibrium. Finally, I = M and J = N are the
only subsets of pure strategies satisfying (i) and (ii) in Lemma 6.2, hence the
only supports of t-equilibria. Hence, in the limit each player plays his third
strategy, resulting in the `payo®s' (3;3).








The following combinations satisfy (i) and (ii) in Lemma 6.2:
(a) I = f3g, J = f1g, resulting in (3;1) in the limit;
(b) I = f1g, J = f3g, resulting in (1;3) in the limit;
(c) I = f1;3g, J = f2;3g, resulting in (1;2) in the limit;
(d) I = f2;3g, J = f1;3g, resulting in (2;1) in the limit;
(e) I = M, J = N, resulting in (2;2) in the limit.
This means that the `payo® pairs' that can arise as limits of t-equilibria are
(6;3), (3;6), (8;5), (5;8), and (7;7).
7 Concluding remarks
There is quite some literature on noncooperative games with only ordinal pref-
erences: many economic games (for instance, Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly
games) belong to this category, but also games used for implementing social
choice correspondences, to name just a few examples. However, apart from
Fishburn (1978) the only references to ordinal games with mixed strategies that
we know of are BÄ orgers (1993) and Rothe (1995). BÄ orgers (1993) proposes a def-
inition of rationalizability in which only ordinal preferences over outcomes are
assumed to be common knowledge. Rothe (1995) considers equilibrium selection
in 2 £ 2-games under the ¯rst-degree stochastic dominance criterion.
There are several possible extensions of the present model that we list here
without any implication about their interest: extension to more than 2 play-
ers; to non-strict preferences; to the players being characterized by di®erent t's;
14and to letting t vary continuously instead of in discrete steps. More generally,
another extension is obtained by letting U¾ and U¿ denote classes of utility func-
tions representing the ordinal preferences of players 1 and 2, and by considering
(U¾;U¿)-equilibria, i.e., strategy combinations that are Nash equilibrium for at
least one pair of utility functions from U¾ and U¿.
A Remaining proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The proof is by induction on t. For t = 1 the formula
holds by de¯nition of A. Let the formula be true for all k < t, where t ¸ 2.













where the second equality holds by induction. If i > j then every alj = 0 in the










(t ¡ 2 + l ¡ i)!
(l ¡ i)!(t ¡ 2)!
: (15)
We are done if we can prove
j X
l=i
(t ¡ 2 + l ¡ i)!
(l ¡ i)!(t ¡ 2)!
=
(t ¡ 1 + j ¡ i)!
(j ¡ i)!(t ¡ 1)!
:
We show this again by induction. For j = i it is immediate. Let the equality
hold for i;:::;j ¡ 1, then
j X
l=i
(t ¡ 2 + l ¡ i)!
(l ¡ i)!(t ¡ 2)!
=
(t ¡ 1 + j ¡ 1 ¡ i)!
(j ¡ 1 ¡ i)!(t ¡ 1)!
+
(t ¡ 2 + j ¡ i)!
(j ¡ i)!(t ¡ 2)!
=
(t ¡ 1 + j ¡ i ¡ 1)!(j ¡ i) + (t ¡ 2 + j ¡ i)!(t ¡ 1)
(j ¡ i)!(t ¡ 1)!
=
(t ¡ 1 + j ¡ i)!
(j ¡ i)!(t ¡ 1)!
:
This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1. The proof is by induction on t. For t = 1 the identity
in the lemma holds by de¯nition. Assume it holds for every k < t (t ¸ 2). Let
l 2 f1;:::;`g. Then
Ft
r = Ft¡1
r A = rAt¡1A = rAt;
15where the second equality follows by induction. 2




(t ¡ 1 + j ¡ i)!
(j ¡ i)!(t ¡ 1)!
¢
(j ¡ i0)!(t ¡ 1)!
(t ¡ 1 + j ¡ i0)!
=
(j ¡ i + 1) ¢ (j ¡ i + 2)¢¢¢(j ¡ i + t ¡ 1)
(j ¡ i0 + 1) ¢ (j ¡ i0 + 2)¢¢¢(j ¡ i0 + t ¡ 1)
=
(j ¡ i0 + t) ¢ (j ¡ i0 + t + 1)¢¢¢(j ¡ i + t ¡ 1)




i0j and limt!1 at
ij=at
i0j = 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.4 By Lemma 2.1, the probability distribution r is
t-undominated if and only if
fx 2 I R` j x · rAtg \ fx 2 I R` j x = sAt for some sg = frAtg:
By a standard separation argument it follows that the two sets on the left-
hand side of this identity can be separated by a hyperplane through rAt with a
nonnegative normal c such that sAtc ¸ rAtc for all probability distributions s
on O. Since the second set is a polytope, this normal can be chosen positive (see





all probability distributions s on O, where u := ¡Atc 2 Ut. Also the converse
of this argument holds, so that the proof of the lemma is complete. 2
B Existence of t-equilibria
We provide an existence proof of t-equilibria by applying the Kakutani ¯xed
point theorem to subsets of the t-best reply correspondences|recall from Sec-
tion 4 that these correspondences themselves are not necessarily upper semi-
continuous.
Consider the two-person game de¯ned in Section 3. Fix a strategy q 2 ¢n







for every p 2 ¢m. Hence
fFt
pq¾ j p 2 ¢mg = convfFt
eiq¾ j i 2 Mg; (17)
where `conv' denotes `the convex hull of'. The t-best replies against q are those
strategies p that generate points on the `southwest corner' of the polytope in
16(17), i.e., each point for which there is no other point in the polytope that has
every coordinate smaller or equal and, thus, t-degree stochastically dominates
it. These undominated points do not necessarily lie in the same face of the
polytope and therefore a convex combination of t-best replies against q is not
necessarily a t-best reply itself against q. So t-best reply correspondences are
not necessarily convex-valued, in contrast with Nash best reply correspondences.
For applying a ¯xed point argument this lack of convexity is not a real problem
since from (17) it is easily seen that the set of t-best replies is homeomorphic
to a convex set. In the proof of the existence result we apply Kakutani to the
correspondences obtained by minimizing sums of coordinates on the polytopes
in (17).
Theorem B.1 Et 6= ; for every t ¸ 1.






pq¾(l) j p 2 ¢m
)
:
Then it is easy to verify that the correspondence q 7! ¹1(q) is nonempty- and
convex-valued, and upper semi-continuous. For player 2, we de¯ne an anal-
ogous correspondence ¢m 3 p 7! ¹2(p) with the same properties. Now the
correspondence
¹ : ¢m £ ¢n 3 (p;q) 7! ¹1(q) £ ¹2(p)
satis¯es all conditions needed to apply the Kakutani ¯xed point theorem. Hence,
there exists a pair (p¤;q¤) with p¤ 2 ¹1(q¤) and q¤ 2 ¹2(p¤). Since, for any
p and q, all elements of ¹1(q) are t-best replies against q and all elements of
¹2(p) are t-best replies against p, this holds in particular for p¤ and q¤. Hence,
(p¤;q¤) 2 Et. 2
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